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This work presents recent research to develop a series 
of optimization- and simulation-based decision support 
tools to aid in operational maritime mission planning 
for integration into the Globally Networked Maritime 
Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center.  We 
present three tools: Global Fleet Station Mission 
Planner recommends route and mission scheduling for a 
naval contingent embarked with training teams and 
sustainment requirements. Combat Logistic Force 
Planner recommends how to employ special transport 
ships that carry ship and aircraft fuel, ordnance, dry 
stores, and food, to sustain navy battle groups operating 
worldwide for 90-180 days.  Container Port Simulation 
models individual container vessels approaching the 
west coast of the U.S., starting with their required 
notice of arrival 96 hours out in the Pacific and, in case 
of closure of the intended destination port, suggests an 
alternate destination port in accordance with the 
shipper’s economic self-interest to minimize time and 
cost to the ultimate destination. 
 




The Operations Research Department at the Naval 
Postgraduate School has over fifty years of experience 
applying scientific, mathematical, and systems tools to 
planning military operations.  In this paper, we 
introduce representative current planning tools in 
development by faculty and operationally-experienced 
military officer students.  Specifically, we tap the most 
recent research in optimization and simulation to 
describe a series of decision support tools to aid in 
operational maritime mission planning for integration 
into a Globally Networked Maritime Headquarters with 
Maritime Operations Center (Department of the Navy 
2008). 
 The specimen planning tools chosen for illustration 
are Global Fleet Station Mission Planner (GFSMP), 
“Navy Combat Logistic Force” (CLF) planner, and 
“Container Port Simulation Model” (CPSM).  Spitz 
(2007), Brown and Carlyle (2008), and Pidgeon (2008), 
respectively, document earlier, prototypic versions of 
these planning tools, and references therein further 
document the needs leading to their development.  
 
 




GFSMP is a mission planning and scheduling 
optimization tool designed to provide fleet staffs the 
ability to examine the feasibility of future deployments 
and activities in support of the Global Fleet Station 
(GFS) concept, Maritime Domain Awareness, and the 
Global Maritime Partnership initiative. 
 GFSMP identifies how one naval ship with 
embarked Expeditionary Partnership Teams (EPTs) can 
best meet logistical and other requirements (such as 
berthing space, budget, re-supply needs, transit times, 
mission requirements, etc.) to provide navy strategic 
priorities in Maritime Security and Theater Security 
Cooperation (TSC).   
 A typical solution would include a deployment 
schedule and the combination of EPTs required to 
perform the missions.  These results can guide planners 
in best utilizing current naval resources available in the 
region and provide insights for future planning, offering 
opportunities to understand where tradeoffs can be 
made.  
 GFSMP is applicable in all theaters using afloat 
basing to support engagement teams. Changing 
limitations on deployment time frame, ship or EPT 
availability, and budget, offer opportunities to 
understand where tradeoffs can be made. GFSMP can 
also be used by planners to understand how different 
ship types may be used to accomplish similar missions.  
Exploration into EPT constraints can help the navy to 
determine team requirements: GFSMP optimally 
allocates training teams to a ship, and schedules the ship 
route to achieve the maximum, aggregate TSC “value” 
for all executed missions.  Here, mission value refers to 
an informed, quantitative assessment of contribution to 
TSC if the mission is performed.  
 
2.2. The Problem 
GFSMP posits a Navy vessel, equipped with EPTs, 
carrying out TSC activities in its area of responsibility 
during a continued period of time referred to as the 
planning horizon.  GFSMP’s primary objective is to 
devise an optimal route and mission schedule that 
maximizes the TSC value collected.  As a secondary 
objective, GFSMP seeks to minimize the total port cost 
incurred while conducting the missions.  (We use the 
term “country” and “port” interchangeably to refer to 
locations where the ship may conduct missions, and/or 
obtain fuel or provisions.) 
 During operations, the ship must maintain at least 
its minimum fuel level as well as maintain sufficient 
provisioning supplies for all personnel.   A fixed 
amount of provisions is consumed every day, depending 
on the personnel deployed.  However, the amount of 
fuel consumed, in barrels per day, depends on the ship’s 
activity, and three burn rates are used:  while underway 
(at a nominal transit speed), while at anchor (supporting 
“hotel load” power requirements), and moored pier-side 
receiving shore power.  Travel times (in days) between 
any pair of ports are pre-calculated based on feasible 
sea routes and the nominal transit speed of the vessel.   
 Each ship incurs a port-dependent charge for each 
day it remains in-port.  This charge also depends on 
whether the ship stays at anchor or docked.  One or 
several fictitious “At Sea” ports represent locations at 
sea where the ship may, for example, conduct multi-
country training missions, or have opportunities to 
schedule underway replenishments (of fuel or 
commodities) at select times when auxiliary fleet ships 
are present in the area (see CLF planner in Section 3). 
 Every candidate mission in each country has a pre-
determined TSC value, a cost, a fixed duration, and can 
be completed by one (among potentially several) EPTs.   
Some missions have precedence requirements in 
relation to other missions such that one mission may 
require one or more other mission(s) to be completed 
before it can be carried out. 
 Every mission requires the ship to deliver a 
qualified EPT to the respective country to complete the 
mission and to pick up the team immediately upon 
completion of that mission.  Additionally, some 
missions may require the ship to stay in-port for the 
duration of the mission.  Also, some missions require 
the ship to be moored pier-side (e.g., in order to load or 
unload heavy equipment) during the first and last days 
of the mission, while other missions may allow the ship 
to remain at anchor.  Each EPT can only participate in 
one mission at a time, but once finished it is assumed to 
become available to perform other missions 
immediately. 
 There is limited availability of each type of EPT.  
Each one has a varying number of personnel, and there 
is limited amount of berthing space to provide for all 
the personnel of all EPTs assigned to the ship.  Thus, in 
addition to selecting the optimal routing and scheduling, 
GFSMP must determine the optimal EPT configuration 
for the deployment. 
 
2.3. Modeling, Scenario and Results 
GFSMP model’s key decision variables are: 
• EPT configuration, i.e., how many teams of 
each type should be embarked on the GFS 
• Mission schedule by country 
• GFS schedule: When the GFS stays in a given 
port (conducting missions or resupplying), or 
is  underway between countries 
• Fuel and supply levels 
   
 To evaluate GFSMP, we use notional data from the 
Fall 2007 Gulf of Guinea (GoG) African Partnership 
Demonstration developed by CNE-C6F GOG Regional 
Planning Team (Spitz 2007), which have also been 
utilized by Second Fleet during Exercise Trident 
Warrior 2009 (TW09).   The original Demonstration 
assumed an amphibious ship LSD-43 and/or a High 
Speed Vessel HSV-2 as the platforms to accomplish 66 
missions over six months.  However, for TW09, LSD-
43 is replaced by USS Kearsarge, LHD-3 (U.S. Navy 
2009).  
 Figure 1 is an example of the recommended route 
and mission schedule for select dates.  (The snapshot 
covers approximately two of the six month’s 
deployment of the GFS.)  Bars indicate the period of 
execution of each mission, with names inside indicating 
the team performing the mission (for example, “NCF” 
refers to a “naval construction force” team).  We can 
observe, for example, that no more than the four 
available NCF teams are used, and that the GFS transit 
between ports while missions are still ongoing, in order 
to maximize mission accomplishment. Overall, GFSMP 
shows that the GFS can complete all missions in 
substantially less time (only five months) than 
originally planned by CNE-C6F (Spitz 2007), and at a 
much lower cost (by incurring in lower port costs). 
 In addition to its capability as a planning tool, 
during the TW09 Exercise GFSMP also proved useful 
by helping planners to deal with a variety of exigencies.  
These included rescheduling the GFS in the middle of 
the deployment due, for example, to the unexpected 
failure of a CLF asset originally scheduled to resupply 
the GFS, or to new requirements for the GFS to engage 
for an extended period (several weeks) in an anti-piracy 
emerging situation.  These disruptions to the baseline 
schedule may require rescheduling or cancelling some 
of the original missions. 
 As U.S. Navy CAPT Lansing, Director, 
Experimentation Directorate, Navy Warfare 
Development Command states, “the use of GFSMP 
proved to be very timely as there is currently no other 
automated aid that can produce optimized courses of 
action for a Global Fleet Station deployment.  GFSMP 
had a significant impact on the operational planning of 
Operational Level Command and Control and the 






























































Figure 1: This is a snapshot of, approximately, two of the six months for which GFSMP plans the routing and scheduling 
of an LHD in the Gulf of Guinea.  During the recommended deployment, the LHD transits through different ports (“Ship 
Voyage” line on top) while accomplishing missions listed on the left.  Bars indicate the execution period of each mission 
and the performing team. 
 
 
3. COMBAT LOGISTIC FORCE PLANNER 
 
3.1. Overview 
The Navy CLF consists of about 30 special transport 
ships that carry ship and aircraft fuel, ordnance, dry 
stores, and food, and deliver these to client combatant 
ships underway, making it possible for U.S. naval 
forces to operate at sea for extended periods.   
 The CLF is being transformed to a fleet with fewer 
different types of transports, and no more total 
transports, but it expects to have to serve more clients 
for a greater variety of deployments in the next decade.  
Conventional planning has relied on steady-state, 
average-rate-of-consumption models and rules-of-
thumb to assess CLF ability to re-supply our fleet 
operations.  Details matter, and we want to determine 
whether or not, and how, the new CLF can actually 
support its anticipated missions. 
 We have modeled CLF operations to evaluate a 
number of transforming initiatives that simplify its 
operation while supporting an even larger number of 
client ships for a greater variety of missions.  Our input 
is an employment schedule for navy battle groups of 
ships operating worldwide, extending over a planning 
horizon of 90-180 days.  We use optimization to advise 
how to sustain these ships.   
 Most U.S. Navy deployments are groups of ships 
assembled with a particular mission.  Some frequent 
examples of these “Battle Groups” (BGs) are a Carrier 
Strike Group (a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, CVN, 
a guided-missile cruiser, CG, two guided-missile 
destroyers, DDG, and a fast combat replenishment 
ship), an Expeditionary Strike Group (an amphibious 
assault ship, LHA or LHD, with a dock landing ship, 
LSD, amphibious transport dock, LPD, a CG and two 
DDGs); a Surface Strike Group (ships equipped with 
missiles and missile defense weapons, such as a CG and 
two DDGs); and a Littoral Combat Squadron (new class 
of small ships where larger ships cannot safely navigate, 
engaging in anti-surface warfare, mine counter 
measures, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, 
homeland defense and maritime interdiction, and 
special operations forces support, each of which we 
treat as a frigate FFG).  Combatant classes are available 
from Jane’s (2008, pp. 873-943). 
 The Combat Logistics force is being consolidated 
to just three ship types, with 30 total ships:  The 
TAO187 (Henry J. Kaiser) which can carry about 
180,000 barrels of fuel oil, and 271 tons of cargo lube 
oil, dry stores, and refrigerated containers, at about 20 
knots; The T-AOE6 (Supply) Class, which can carry 
156,000 barrels of fuel oil, 1,800 tons of ordnance, 250 
tons of dry stores, and 400 tons of refrigerated stores, at 
speeds exceeding 26 knots; And, the T-AKE1 (Lewis & 
Clark), which can carry 18,000 barrels of fuel oil, 5,900 
tons of ordnance, dry stores, and refrigerated stores at 
up to 20 knots.  Customarily, each storage hold is 
designed to carry either ordnance or dry stores, but T-
AKE storage holds can be converted between the two.  
Other ship classes (e.g., T-AE, T-AFS, T-AOE(X), etc.) 
are either scheduled to leave active service for the 
reserve fleet, or are still on the drawing boards.   
 We evaluate new CLF ship designs, advise what 
number of a new ship class would be needed, test 
concepts for forward at-sea logistics bases in lieu of 
conventional ports, demonstrate the effects of changes 
to operating policy, and generally try to show whether 
and how the CLF can support planned naval operations. 
 
3.2. Modeling, Scenario and Results 
We use an integer linear program to plan optimal 
employment of CLF ships to minimize policy penalties 
accruing from any commodity shortage.  Decision 
variables for the CLF model account for: 
 
• Indicators of whether or not at least one shuttle 
visits a given BG on a particular day, and the 
port from where the shuttle is coming  
• Taking stock of each shuttle’s daily 
commodities, and the amounts delivered to a 
BG 
• Taking stock of each BG’s commodity levels, 
and categorizing these by levels of deficiency 
(if any) 
 
 The CLF model can schedule a single shuttle ship 
sortie from port to make many separate consolidation 
(CONSOL) visits, perhaps to different battle groups. 
 Our model takes into account changing daily 
consumption of each of four basic commodities classes 
for each client ship, navigational issues such as slow 
passages through canals, and the possibility of several 
client ships, or groups of ships, running low on the 
same commodity at the same time.  Given a deployment 
scenario and a current configuration of the CLF fleet of 
transports, a solution to our model is a face-valid 
logistical plan for the CLF that minimizes shortfalls of 
any commodity for any customer, highlighting any 
unavoidable low-inventory events, and maximizing the 
utilization of transports by maximizing the total volume 
delivered over the scenario. 
 A typical scenario consists of multiple BGs, and 
for each BG specifies last-minute in-port preparations 
and/or pre-deployment workup training in preparation 
for deployment, a high-speed transit to an area where 
we will show our military presence, a surge into combat 
operations to achieve a given objective, a sustainment 
phase to hold that objective, and perhaps a post-combat 
period where we stand guard and provide humanitarian 
assistance while diplomacy and other non-military 
measures unfold. 
An example planning scenario includes 13 battle 
groups served by nine TAO and seven T-AKE shuttle 
ships over a 90-day planning horizon.  Some of the 
larger battle groups are accompanied by station ships 
(supply ships that serve as accompanying inventory 
vessels).  Five of the battle groups are deployed on day 
one, and the rest deploy on day 10, 12, etc., until all are 
underway to their various areas of operation worldwide.  
Figure 2 depicts totally automatic world sea-route 
model for estimating times and positions of optimally-




Figure 2: Worldwide sea route network.  The static searoutes shown here (as a connected network of ports and at-sea 
location nodes and arcs indicating navigationally adjacent nodes) connect all ports and trans-oceanic routes a CLF ship 
might use at the discretion of the optimization (that the shuttle movements are outputs rather than inputs is a key 
innovation of CLF).  Transit of most arcs can be made at any speed desired, but some arcs (e.g., canals) require a fixed 
transit time.  CLF merges the tracks of combatant customers with these static searoutes to produce the full, worldwide 
maneuver network.  When needed, local operating areas can be embellished with even more at-sea locations and arcs for 
finer fidelity.  Each at-sea location can be coded with an administrative restriction that permits access only to compatibly-
coded CLF ships.  Each port may accommodate only a subset of CLF ships by type or by hull number, and each port may 
offer only a subset of commodities. 
 
 
    
 A monolithic (i.e., omniscient) solve of this 
situation generates an optimization model with about 
367,000 constraints and about 23,000 variables.  A 
cascade (i.e., myopic) solve using a 30-day planning 
windows advanced 15 days at a time yields a sequence 
of problems with between about 37,000 and 75,000 
constraints and between 6,000 and 9,000 variables.  The 
monolith takes several hours to solve on a 2-GHz 
laptop, while the cascade takes a few minutes.  For this 
particular case, the two solutions compare closely.  The 
CLF fleet conducts a total of 101 CONSOLs (i.e., 
deliveries).  The availability in this scenario of forward 
(i.e., close to the areas of operation) supply base ports is 
key:  our average cycle times from a CONSOL back to 
a port and on to the next CONSOL is only just over five 
days, two of which are spent pierside loading the shuttle 
ship. 
 A cumulant inventory constraint, combined with 
an elastic violation device for a shortage, and another 
for extremis shortage, combine to signal a deficiency, 
and carry this forward, paying a daily penalty, until this 
deficiency is remediated.  The distinction between 
shortage and extremis penalties is important:  CLF ships 
are equitably assigned to CONSOL all customers by 
maximizing deliveries, to preferentially serve needy 
customers by CONSOL to avoid shortage, and to 
energetically serve customers in extremis.  
 CLF (Brown and Carlyle 2008) is a strategic 
planning model to assess our ability to supply about a 
dozen large carrier battle groups.  The Trident Warrior 
09 Exercise includes many operations in the Gulf of 
Guinea, a long way from resupply ports, and CLF has 
been generalized to be an operational planning model 
serving individual ships worldwide.  CLF shuttle 
employments can now include unlimited consolidations 
between port calls for reloading ─so may consolidations 
that a shuttle ship may end up resembling a station ship 
(i.e., a ship that accompanies a deployed battle group), 
though our shuttles may switch customers as 
advantageous).  There are now many more ports, and 
each port may only offer some subset of commodities.  
Deployed combatants can now be scheduled to make 
port calls for resupply pierside.  To enhance operational 
planning, CLF now runs faster, and features a graphical 
user interface offering geographic views of the world, 
hemispheres, or operating areas with high close-up 
resolution.  The display now includes animation of 
moving shuttles and their moving customers to better 
help planners understand the prescribed ballet.  CLF 
became a centerpiece for TW09, providing quick, 
trustworthy advice in response to the exigent events that 




4. CONTAINER PORT SIMULATION MODEL  
CPSM models the effects of a transportation security 
incident on one or more of the U.S. West coast marine 
container ports.  Operation of the container ports on the 
U.S. west coast is critical to ongoing national 
commerce.  We built a simulation model of the seven 
major West-coast container ports to study their ability 
to process container throughput, and especially to 
measure what would happen system-wide were one or 
more ports taken out or degraded due to a natural or 
human-caused event. 
 We modeled individual container vessels starting 
with their Notice of Arrival 96 hours out in the Pacific.  
Vessels then travel to their intended port, or to an 
alternate port if the intended port is closed.  In the case 
of closure of the intended port, an alternate port is 
advised in accordance with the shipper’s own economic 
self-interest, with an eye toward minimizing time and 
cost to the ultimate destination.  Once at a port, either 
intended or diverted, the vessel unload time is 
accounted for, and the shipment is broken into ten 
pieces bound for each one-digit ZIP code in the 
continental United States.  These landside shipments 
then travel to their designated aggregate destinations. 
 We have collected data on vessel arrival patterns 
by intended port, unload time, port capacities (berths), 
landside travel times, and various costs, including 
demurrage costs for freight.  These real data were then 
used to specify inputs to the model, both deterministic 
constants like distances and speeds, as well as 
probability distributions from which uncertain elements 
like arrival times, number of containers on a ship, and 
unload times were generated. 
 We have built several alternate versions of the 
model, treating different scenarios of port transportation 
security incidents.  We built models both with and 
without the proposed port at Punta Colonet, Mexico, to 
see how the presence of that port might help maintain 
operations in the face of U.S. port closures.  The model 
was run for a one-year planning horizon in each of 
several configurations, with thousands of replications to 
assure adequate statistical precision.  The model has 
been streamlined to be general and scalable in the 
number of ports, and an animation has been used to help 
with model verification and establishing credibility  
CPSM was validated by modeling the ten-day closure in 
2002 when members of the International 
Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) 
were locked out in retaliation for a labor slowdown on 
the part of the union. 
 
 
Figure 3: Screenshot of Arena CPSM (top flowchart) and animation (bottom) of West-coast container-port operations.  
At the time of this screen shot, both the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach are closed, so vessel traffic is being 
diverted to other ports, mostly to the proposed port in Punta Colonet, Mexico. 
 
 Figure 3 is a screenshot of the model implemented 
in the Arena simulation software (Kelton, Sadowski, 
and Swets 2010) to illustrate both the logic (the 
flowchart at the top) and the animation at the bottom.  
The logic flowchart at the top proceeds from left to 
right:  the first blocked-out area is arrival of ships to 
their Notice of Arrival positions, the next block is the 
port-selection logic including choosing the next-best 
port if the intended port is closed, next is unloading 
operations at the berth (including any necessary 
queueing), next is landside storage at the port, next is 
overland transit, and finally arrival of a shipment to its 
destination ZIP code.  The map animation at the bottom 
shows movement of ships as well as the ZIP code loads 
once the ship is unloaded and broken into ten loads.  
The queue and plot animations in the middle depict 
queues of ships for berths, utilization levels of berths, 
and graphs of both the number of ships and number of 
containers in the system at any given time.  This 
particular situation shows a point near the middle of the 
year a few weeks after the ports of Los Angeles and 
Long Beach were taken out, so ships bound for those 
ports are being diverted mostly to Punta Colonet to the 
south, and the graphs show significant spikes of both 
the number of ships and number of containers in the 
systems, representing increased congestion and delays 
due to the closure of these two major ports.  Later in 
this scenario, the ports of LA and LB were gradually 
brought back up in groups of berths at a time, and 
congestion was eventually relieved as these full-
capacity ports eventually worked off the backups.  
Other scenarios without the availability of Punta 
Colonet resulted in even worse congestion, delays, and 
costs.  In this way, the model quantifies the effects of 
port closures, and can thus be used as a decision-making 
aid. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper we have presented the GFSMP, CLF and 
CPSM optimization- and simulation-based decision 
support tools.  We have illustrated application of 
GFSMP and CLF to exercises developed by U.S. 
Commander, Second Fleet, exhibiting significant 
improvements over manual planning.  As these tools 
continue to be used by Navy staffs and modified with 
their suggestions, the longer-range intent is that they are 
integrated into a suite of decisions aids supporting 
maritime planning staffs. 
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